1 Frances H. Miller, "Trusting Doctors: Tricky Business When It Comes to Clinical Research," [cite, manuscript at 3, n. 12] (hereinafter "Trusting Doctors"). See also, Mark Barnes and Sara Krauss, "Conflicts of Interest in Human Research: Risks and Pitfalls of 'Easy Money' in Research Funding," 9 BNA Health Law Reporter at [p. 6 of Westlaw citation 9BHLR 1378] ("Among the most criticized research compensation practices has been the payment by research sponsors of per patient "enrollment bonuses" to physicians."). 2 Miller, "Trusting Doctors," supra note 1 at [manuscript at 16, n. 68] . See also Barnes and Krauss, supra note 1, at [p. 2 of Westlaw printout] ("Also of significant concern is that physician-researchers and/or host institutions may take 'stakes'-such as stock options or equity ownership-in the companies whose drugs, devices, or gene therapy products are being tested by those physicians and/or those hospitals.") 3 There are no federal laws that forbid physicians from having ownership interests in products under investigation or in companies owning such products. See Barnes and Krauss, supra note 1, at [pp. 3] (stating that the most restrictive federal regulation of financial conflicts of interest merely proposes certain financial disclosure obligations on organizations and their researchers). I am unaware of any state laws to the contrary. Enrollment incentives might violate the federal Anti-Kickback Law, i.e., if they are intended to induce physicians to purchase drugs or services to be paid for by Medicaid or Medicare, but not if they "are at all related to the value of research services performed." Id. at [p. 6] . Typically, there are actual costs associated with the research, and it may be difficult to separate actual costs from any added "incentive payment." See, e.g., Recruiting Human Subjects: Pressures in Industry-Sponsored Clinical Research, Office of the [DHHS] Inspector General (June 200) OEI-01-97-00195, at 17 (hereinafter "Recruiting Human Subjects"). 4 The American Medical Association's Principles of Medical Ethics do not address conflicts of interest, either in practice or in research. See AMA, Principles of Medical Ethics, in Rena A. Gorlin, Codes of Professional Responsibility 341 (4 th ed.1999). There are two advisory opinions of the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs that generally address a physician's ethical responsibilities in clinical research. One opinion sets forth comprehensive guidelines for physicians engaging in clinical investigation of new drugs and procedures; it does not mention conflicts of interest, financial or otherwise. Opinion 2.07, Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, in Gorlin, supra, at 350. The other opinion specifically addresses conflicts of interest in biomedical research; rather than providing guidelines directly for physicians, however, it simply states that "[a]ll medical centers should develop specific guidelines for their clinical staff on conflicts of interest," and further, that these guidelines should include a rule that "once a clinical investigator becomes involved in a research project for a company or knows that he or she might become involved, she or he, as an individual cannot ethically buy or sell the company's stock until the involvement ends and the results of the research are published or otherwise disseminated to the January Although the rationale for the suggested guideline is not given, I assume that the intent is to prohibit illegal insider trading. Thus, the suggested guidelines do not prohibit physicians from having financial ties to companies whose products they are investigating; rather, they merely require that such ties be disclosed to the medical center where the research is conducted. Id. The suggested guidelines also require that "any remuneration received by the researcher from the company whose product is being studied must be commensurate with the efforts of the researcher on behalf of the company," id.; this guideline does not clearly prohibit incentive payments, as it appears to permit compensation for more than the actual costs of a physician's participation in a clinical study. One medical association recently adopted a flat ban on physicians from having ownership interests in companies whose products they are testing, but this position is clearly the exception and not the rule. See infra note [ ] & accompanying text. 5 As Professor Miller notes, federal law requires only that physicians disclose financial conflicts to the institution sponsoring the study; it does not require disclosure to the subjects of the investigation. See Miller, "Trusting Doctors," supra note 1 After all, unlike the legal profession, the medical profession lacks a strong tradition of regulating 9 Moore, "Doctors and Lawyers," supra note 8 at 179. "Thus, physicians who voted to reverse their original vote banning self-referrals apparently did so because they were angered by the implication that they could not be trusted to act professionally in caring for their patients. These physicians understand that it is unethical to recommend unnecessary procedures or to refer patients to inappropriate facilities; however, they 'object to the implication that every physician that [sic] is involved in some kind of facilities is guilty of a violation of ethics.'" (Footnotes omitted.) 16 As Professor Miller notes, although it is generally believed that physicians owe fiduciary duties to their patients, there is some question whether fiduciary law applies to the same extent to physicians as it does to other fiduciaries. Miller, "Trusting Doctors," supra note 1, at [12/20 manuscript Other papers in this conference have questioned both the necessity and the desirability of using fiduciary law for these purposes. I take no position here on that extraordinarily interesting issue. For purposes of this paper, I take as a given the application of the traditional fiduciary model to physician-patient and attorney-client relationships. 19 Moore, "Attorney-Client Confidentiality," supra note [8] , at 183. 20 Marc A. Rodwin, "The Organized American Medical Profession's Response to Financial Conflicts of Interest: 1890 -1992 ," 70 Milbank Quarterly 703,705 (1992 (discussing physician view of conflicts of interest "as matters of personal ethics").. 21 Moore, "Attorney-Client Confidentiality," supra note [8], at 183. 22 Id. (citing AMA reaffirmance of status of Principles of Medical Ethics"not as 'laws, but standards of conduct which define the essentials of honorable behavior for the physician'"). 23 Id. (citing "the rider habitually attached by the British Medical Association when giving 'advice' to its members [that] explicitly states that it is open to the doctor to act in accordance with the dictates of his conscience"). 24 Cf. Nancy J. Moore, "The Usefulness of Ethical Codes," 1989 Annual Survey of American Law 7, 12 (discussing the views of philosopher John Ladd, who views ethics as "'an open-ended, reflective and critical intellectual activity,' one which cannot be captured in the promulgation of even voluntary rules, guidelines or standards"). Given such a broad definition of "conflict of interest", 31 it is not surprising that physicians resist either required disclosures or other "precautionary measures." After all, conflicts of interest in this broad sense may be the "central problem" of professions, perhaps even their "defining characteristic." 32 And if, "[b] y definition, the function of a professional is to serve interests beyond the professional's own self-interest," 33 then any attempt to regulate all such conflicts does indeed appear to be a daunting, nigh impossible task.
But lawyers do not typically define "conflicts of interest" so broadly. Of course, lawyers understand that there is pervasive conflict between the interest of lawyers and their clients and that with respect to most of these conflicts, there is little to be done other than to rely on lawyers'
professionalism, that is, their willingness to exercise self-restraint. 34 But for lawyers, there is a difference between conflicts of interest in this broad sense and conflicts of interest in the narrower sense reflected in both fiduciary law and ethics codes. What I will call "conflict-ofinterest doctrine" does not purport to regulate circumstances that are common to all lawyers, but only those circumstances that may be unique to specific lawyers. In other words, conflict-ofinterest doctrine in law does not address the largely unavoidable conflicts, but only those that
